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BOOK REVIEWS
CrinmqATL JusT cc
AiAnOA. By Roscoe Pound, Henry Holt &
Company, 1930. Pp. xiv, 226.
This work, consisting of a series of lectures, by a great legal
scholar, is the product of a wide learning and a deep practical insight
into one of the most perplexing problems of modern times; the problem
of criminal justice. Complaint of non-enforcement is as old as the
law itself, but there are several reasons peculiar to America that have
tended to aggravate the problem in this country. (1) The pioneer
spirit is largely responsible for our inefficient administration of criminal justice. As the pioneer saw himself, his virtues were indepen.
dence and self-reliance, versatility and a preference for short cuts and
easy methods. (p. 123). He favored decentralization and a diffusion of
responsibility (p. 182). Being a strong individualist, he was hostile
to discipline, good order and obedience (p. 51). These pioneer ideas
have done much mischief in the development of our criminal judicial
machinery. (2) Democratic ideas reinforced the pioneer attitude
toward the criminal law. Our polity had its roots in the era of the
Puritan Revolution. The whole emphasis was on liberty as contrasted
with order, on rights as contrasted with duties, on checks upon government as contrasted with efficient government, on the danger of governmental oppression as contrasted with the menace of anti-social individual action (p. 132). The feeling that each man, as an organ of the
sovereign democracy, is in some sense above the law which he helps
to make, fosters impatience of legal methods, disrespect for legal
institutions and even a spirit of resistance to them (p. 52). The fear
that experts and specialists might get on top have prevented them from
being on top. (3)
The belief in natural rights is closely associated
with the above, and has contributed to the maladministration of justice.
The founders of our polity believed in a "natural right of revolution"
and argued that conformity to the dictates of the individual conscience
was the test of the validity of a law (p. 52). Dean Pound says, "Yet
so deep-seated is this mode of thinking that the same conscientious
and well meaning citizens who challenge private judgments in others,
insist that iven constitutional guarantees, as well as the settled common law safeguards of accused persons, shall give way to what their
private judgment assures them is enforcement of the paramount law."
(p. 131). This is the only reference in the book to prohibition enforcement and the author accounts for this in the preface by stating
that these lectures were delivered in 1923 and should speak from
that date. "This caution seems expedient lest they should appear to
pass a present judgment on what I am now required to look into more
deeply." The experiences of Dean Pound on the Wickersham Commission should serve as the basis for a valuable supplement to this work.
Another factor making for difficulty in the administration of
criminal justice is that of (4) political Influence. Pressure from
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politicians and from professional bondsmen, which no political officer
can ignore, makes for a lax administration. Further, throughout the
course of a prosecution the exigencies of politics urge utilizing of the
opportunities of publicity at the expense of efficiency (186).
(5) The
growth of urban industrial centers has made our nineteenth century
judicial machinery which was adapted to a rural, agricultural society
an intolerable anachronism (p. 155). (6) The creation of new crimes
by legislative fiat has added to the difficulty of enforcement and the
disrespect for law. Taking the State of Rhode Island as a typical
illustration, the author shows that the number of crimes for which one
may be prosecuted has very much more than doubled in fifty years, and
has multiplied by eight in one hundred years (p. 17). A portion of
this increase is to be expected from the very growth and complexity
of modern life but it would seem that Dean Pound has not laid
sufficient emphasis on the fact that many of these new crimes are to
be accounted for as the result of a present day obsession that it is
possible to create morality by law. The growth of sumptuary legislation and the attempt to pass a law and save a soul, has done much
to account for the present disrespect for law and the breakdown of
the machinery of criminal justice. There is food for reflection ini
the Nicholas Murray Butler thesis that in a search for the causes of
lawlessness we should look first of all at the law. Calvin Coolidge,
when Vice president of the United States, had the same thought in
mind when he declared, "Real reform does not begin with a law, it
ends with a law. The attempt to dragoon the body when the need
Is to convince the soul will end only in revolt." In the diagnosis,
we believe there is one other important factor that Dean Pound has
omitted. That is the influence of the war-psychosis on the present
lawless enforcement of the law. The precedent established by
patrioteer organizations and voluntary law enforcement auxiliary
agencies, motivated by a zealous belief that the end justified the
means, has done much to contribute to our present sorry plight.
(7) The present administrative nachinery of criminal justice is
inadequate because there is a lack of proper organization, a diffusion
of responsibility, a faulty esprit des corps negativing cooperation as
between officials and a want of continuity-of personnel. So much for
the diagnosis.
Dean Pound suggests some constructve proposals for improving
our criminal judicial machinery. (1) A unified judicial organization for
the whole state (p. 202); (2) an improvement in legislative technique
(p. 208); (3) a reform of judicial procedure not so much by legislative
dictation of minutiae as by judicial rule making with the aid of
judicial councils and (4) an adequate provision for petty prosecutions
(p. 189). Along with these structural changes, there is a need of
educating our people to accept a new juristic philosophy. "The orthodox natural-rights individualism Is as obsolete as the orthodox Marxian
socialism. Instead of valuing all things in terms of individual personality, or in terms of politically organized society, we must value
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them in terms of civilization, of raising human powers to their highest
possible unfolding-towards which spontaneous free individual action
and collective organized effect both contribute" (p. 215). Three special
ends should be kept in view in the endeavor to reach this ultimate
aim under the conditions of the time-namely, preventitive justice, a
system of individualized treatment of offenders, and a readjustment of
our legally received ideals as to the balance between the general security and the individual life (p. 213).
FonREST REvERE BLAcx.
University of Kentucky,
College of Law.
PATENT AcCOUNTINGS. By Bert Louis Klooster, New York:
tice-Hall, Inc. 1930, pp. xxvii, 795.

Pren-

This is a study of the method of executing the interlocutory decrees
entered by courts of equity pending the final award for patent infringements. It is a compilation of quotations and excerpts of court opinions upon rules of damage in patent infringement. Liability is determined in one of three ways: (a) Profits which the infringer earns
by the infringement; (b) The reduction which the infringer caused
in the patentee's profits; (c) A reasonable royalty.
The poor organization of the material is the chief criticism to be
made of the book. The section on "Profits and Deductions" contains
forty chapters and one hundred and eighty-six pages. Chapter forty Is
composed of two and one half lines and cites one case. This we
submit is a challenge to Professor Himmelblau's observation in the
"Foreword" that, "Here in convenient form is contained all available
information which an accountant needs before proceeding with his
'field work'." (Italics are those of the reviewer.) Whatever might be
the author's scruple upon the ethics of individual accountants advertising, he apparently sees no objection to advancing the cause of the
trade as a whole. Instead of basing the final award upon the report
of the master, he recommends that it be based upon the report of a
disinterested accountant. After reviewing the difficulties of the courts
in arriving at a satisfactory measure of damages, he recommends that
the courts and the lawyers step out of the picture and let the public
accountant perform the service. The savings emphasized by such a
procedure are the fees of the master and the attorneys during long
periods of accounting; and the expense of the parties employing their
own accountant to make special reports to the master. It has the
further advantage of expediting the procedure so that the period of
accounting might be reduced from years to a few weeks or perhaps
months. He also suggests that in making the report to the court, the
accountant should be subject to cross examination by the attorneys
for both parties.
The aim of reducing the cost of the accountings is undoubtedly a
laudable one. Following the well known rules of value however, one is
inclined to question how much the fee would be of that prodigious
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Individual who would be willing to assume the responsibility; who
would have the legal training and judgment; and who would perform
the services of a master and counsel for both parties, in a few weeks
or a month, which ordinarily requires years to perform. Weighing
the supply of available individuals against the demand for their services one is inclined to anticipate a value for those services which
greatly exceed the usual fee of the practitioner.
The expression of the belief that a great part of the difficulties
can be overcome by means of educational forces seems sound. Accountants of the future by proper training will anticipate the difficulties of
"apportionment of profits" in the event of patent infringements. As
a consequence proper records will be provided. If the profits of the
patented article are segregated from the profits of the non-patented
article most of the difficulties have been avoided.
The sections upon "Damages", "Profits and Deductions", "Apportionment of Profits", and "Reasonable Royalty" should be of interest
to both. the Patent Lawyer and the Public Accountant. The problems
of the appendix are worthy of consideration by teachers of Cost
Accounting.
CoLvIN P. Rousn.
College of Commerce,
University of Kentucky.
L&w AND Ti MoDEa MInD. By Jerome Frank, New York, Brentanos, 1930. Pp. xvii, 362.
In our opinion, "Law and the Modern Mind" constitutes the most
effective attack that has been made on legal fundamentalism. In a
series of brilliant and thought-provoking chapters, Mr. Frank criticises
the basic myth underlying the orthodoxy of the old legal school, to-wit:
that the law must be uniform, general, continuous and predictable.
The author stresses the complexity and the dynamic character of
modern life both of which nfake anything like complete legal certainty
impossible of realization. After exploding the myth that the law is
a "brooding omnipresence in the sky", there is an affirmative defense
of the thesis that much of the uncertainty of lav is not an unfortunate
accident; it is of immense social value. In evaluating the conflicting
demands of the need of stability and the need Of change, Mr. Frank
has drawn heavily from the juristic philosophy of Holmes, Cardozo,
Several chapters are devoted to an
Cook, Demogue and Wurzel.
analysis of corrollarles growing out of the basic myth of certainty.
Because lawyers, more than most men, are compelled to reconcile incompatibles, there are more rationalizations discernible in their reasoning than In most other fields. Also, the myth that the judges have no
power to change existing law or make new law is a direct outgrowth
of a subjective need for believing in a stable, approximately, unalterable legal world. Further, a belief in legal absolutism leads to wordworship and a reliance on word-magic and talismanic phrases. It also
leads to an undue emphasis on formal logic. As Mr. Frank remarks,
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"the syllogism will not supply either the major premise or the minor
premise. The 'joker' is to be found in the selection of these premises."
(p. 66).
"Like Plato, the further the legal philosopher of the nineteenth
century was from the facts, the nearer he thought himself to truth".
(p. 97) The political, economic and moral prejudices of the judge are
largely responsible for the judge's hunches that select the major
premises and make the law. When it is frankly recognized that the
"idiosynratic biases" of the judge have much to do in the making of
law, much of the certainty end predictability of the law vanish. Men
are prone to see what they want to see and this is true also after they
don the judicial robes and consequently there is some truth In the
witty remark that the United States Supreme Court is the "court of
ultimate conjecture." (p. 46). Lawyers are constantly looking into
the motives and biases of clients and witnesses, but those of the old
school are peculiarly reluctant to look into the motives and biases of
judges (p. 177). Another evil growing out of the basic myth and the
attempt to mechanize the law is that human beings are treated like
identical mathematical units. Under this theory little allowance can
be made for justice in the particular case.
The average judge sincerely believes that he is using his intellect
as "a cold logic engine" in utilizing the doctrine of stare decists. Mr.
Frank says, "A satirist might indeed suggest that it is regrettable
that the practice of precedent-mongering does not involve CONSCIOUS
deception, for it would be comparatively easy for judges entirely aware
of what they are doing, to abandon such conscious deception and to
report accurately how they arrive at their decisions. Unfortunately
most judges have no such awareness. Worse than that, they are
not even aware that they are not aware. Sudges Holmes, Cardozo,
Hand, Hutcheson, Lehman and a few others have attained the enlightened statd of awareness of their unawareness" (p. 153). In his plea
for individualization and fluidity in the law, Mr. Frank suggests that
the "good judge would do well to take over into the law something of
the golfer's technique of keeping the eye on the ball with regard
to present facts and future consequences".
(p. 156).
In conclusion, two criticisms should be considered. (1)
It seems
to us that the author gives undue emphasis to "childish thought ways"
in endeavoring to explain why legal fundamentalism is the orthodox
view of the legal profession. Mr. Frank says that "the child is (1)
a wishful thinker who, (2) in the interests of his desires for harmony,
chancelessness and certainty, builds for himself an oversimplified,
over-unified, novelty-less world to conform to his desires, heedless of
the lack of correspondence of this construction with the world of
actual experience, and (3) who Is aided in contriving this world by
his implicit belief in the magic efficacy of words". (p. 75). He concludes that the lawyer seeks unrealizable certainty in law because
he has not yet relinquished the childish need for an authoritative
father and unconsciously has tried to find In the law a substitute for

BooK REVws
those attributes of firmness, sureness, certainty and infallibility
ascribed in childhood to the father, (p. 21).
We believe that the
author has given too much emphasis to this "partial explanation"
espeelally in view of the fact -that he has failed to show clearly why
men (who are also grown up children) in other fields of knowledge
have not been similarly influenced by childish thought ways. But this
point is not of great importance anyway. The chief value of the work
is in showing the evils that flow from legal fundamentalism.
The most serious criticism that can be made of the book is that
the author in attempting to demolish the static, absolutist conception
has over-stated his case. In the brilliant marshalling of facts and -the
keen use of analysis and satire, Mr. Frank has given the fundamentalist a naivete and an inanity that he does not possess. It is much like
the treatment accorded John Austin by the pluralistic school. Mr.
Frank's proposal is obviously more applicable to the field of public
law, than in that of private law. Dean Pound, in his writings, has
shown the need for greater certainty and rigidity in cases relating to
"property" and "commercial and business transactions" than in those
cases raising problems of "human conduct" or involving "the conduct of
enterprise" where the question at issue depends on fraud, bona fides or
negligence. Granting that it is difficult to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the two classes, we are still of the opinion that the
Pound idea has not been undermined. The Frank thesis is peculiarly
susceptible to abuse in its interpretation by faddists who would like
to overemphasize the elements of complexity and flux in our modern
life. No doubt many readers who are sympathetic with the Frank
point of view will go much further than the author and will frown
upon the attempt that is being made by the American Law Institute
to restate portions of the law. But in spite of its exaggeration, which
we believe is intentional, the book has great value as a challenge to
those of the orthodox school. We trust that the work will have a
wide circulation, and if so, we believe that it will do much to dispel
the Judicial somnambulism that is at present the curse of our craft.
College of Law,
FORREST REvERE BLAOE,
University of Kentucky.
TENURE OF OFFICE UNDER TEE CoNsTITuTIoN. James Hart. The
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1930. Pp. viii, 384.
This book is an expansion of an article that originally appeared in
the American Political Science Review under the title "The Bearing
of Myers v. United States Upon the Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals." The Myers case is one of the most important constitutional decisions of recent years raising the question as to the
respective powers of the President and the Congress over removals
of federal officials. The Supreme Court realizing the significance of
the case allotted two days for the argument. James M. Beck presented
the case for executive removal and George Wharton Pepper defended
the doctrine of legislative control over removals.
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Professor Hart by way of introduction points out the rapid growth
in the last two decades of federal boards and conmissions which are
outside the ten great executive departments. His primary thesis is to
present a case for some independence of tenure for these commissions.
He stresses the desirability of guaranteeing such independence through
the interposition of legal restraints upon the President's power of
removal as a matter of legislative policy. In defending the constitutional argument in favor of the validity of such Congressional legislation he attempts to show (and we believe successfully) that the Myers
case, interpreted in the light of a strict application of the principle
of stare decisis, does not necessarily preclude the application of the
constitutional theory advocated by the author.
The Constitution is silent on the power of removal and administrative supervision. The Convention debates do not afford an answer
to the problem. From the fact that the Constitution specifies tenure
during "good behavior" for judges alone, may the inference be drawn
that the framers did not intend to guarantee other officers such tenure?
And does Congress in relation to the other officers have the right to
determine not only the maximum term but also have the power of
plenary control over the whole problem of tenure? If such is the case,
in the absence of such legislation, are we to infer that Congress intends tenure during good hebavior, or are we to infer a conditional
power of removal on the part of the President? Or are distinctions to
be drawn on the basis of the character of the office?
The main contribution lies in the technique of approach utilized
by the author in the examination of this knotty problem. In the words
of Professor Hart, "In primary aim, it is a study in politico-legal processes from the point of view represented by John Dewey in logic,
philosophy, ethics and politics, and by Mr. Justice Holmes and W.
W. Cook in law." It constitutes a departure from and a protest
against barren logic and formal legalism. It is a profound analysis,
cleverly executed and represents in the opinion of the reviewer one
of the best applications of the Pound-Cardozo sociological method.
In a situation where there is a choice of competing premises, the court
should select those which lead to the socially more expedient consequences.
FORUEST REWERE BLAox,
College of Law,
University of Kentucky.
FEDEPA JUnISDIOTIOx A-D Poc num By John C. Rose. Fourth
(4th) Editions. Albany, N. Y.: Matthew Bender and Company, Inc.
1931. Pp. xxxix, 1138.
Mr. Rose, United States Circuit Judge, is one of the greatest
contributors of manuals and reference books on the jurisdiction of
and procedure in the Federal Courts. He has revised his last authoritative manual of Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (3rd edition) to
embrace the many important changes that have been made since its
publication in 1926, namely (1) the enactment of the new United
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States Code; (2) the passage of several important acts by Congress
amending the Judicial Code, particularly in reference to Appellate
Procedure; (3) Writ of Error which has been abolished in federal
appellate practice, substituting appeals in lieu thereof (A); (4) revision of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States on July
1st, 1928 (B) and (5) the adoption of a new Equity Rule 70/2, by the
Supreme Court the latter part of the past year. It is apparent, after
noting the above important changes in the rules of federal jurisdiction
and especially procedure, since the author revised his earlier works
(1st and 2nd editions) on the subject in the third edition, -hat this
book will be a welcome addition to our libraries. The book is the
last word in the field it covers-the Bible for controversies in Federal
courts.
Mr. John C. Knox, United States District Judge of the Southern
District of New York, speaking of this book said, "When Judge Rose
wrote his book on 'Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure' he conferred a
favor on all of us who have anything to do with the Federal Courts.
With clarity, conciseness and directness, he stripped the mystery from
his subject matter, and has enabled us to see an important branch of
jurisprudence as it actually exists. It is seldom that a book is based
on such wide experience and breadth of learning a buttresses the text
of this volume. Truly indeed, his work lives after him."
The purpose of the book, according to the author, is to state and
briefly explain the general rules which determine the jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts; to give some account of the organization of the
Federal judicial system; to point out the more important respects in
which the procedure of these tribunals differs from those of the states;
and to say a little about those subjects of general law upon which
they do not feel themselves bound to follow the decisions of the state
courts.
The book deals first with the important question of jurisdiction.
Chapter one, entitled "The Origin and the Limits of the Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts", includes sections which explain the details of
bringing and maintaining actions in the Federal Courts. The second
and third chapters, deal with the Supreme Court of the United States
and its jurisdictional limitations, and the history and organization of
the Inferior courts of the United States. Special emphasis should be
placed upon the chapter on Criminal Procedure, which is clear, coherent and complete. The author retained a description of the practice
of equity as it existed before the promulgation of the new rules.
Mr. Rose, in the opinion of this reviewer, has done a good piece
of work covering a large subject in some eleven hundred pages. The
only animadversion that may be made is that the procedure in Bankruptcy, the subject of perhaps the greatest number of cases in the Federal district courts with the possible exception of those dealing with
Infraction of the Eighteenth Amendment, is passed over with few
comments.
Procedure is a technical subject; yet the author is not concerned
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other than to tell the practitioner what steps to take. He is not a
reformer.
The
A valuable collection of forms is appended, along with:
original Judiciary Act (1 Stat. 73); The Judicial Code, with amendments as contained in the U. S. Code annotated; Equity Rules (28
U. S. C. A. sec. 723) and Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the
United States with index thereto.
Lexington, Kentucky.
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CA.SES Ox =E LAw OF INsunAwcs By William Reynolds Vance.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1931. Pp. xxiii, 1020.
The second edition of Professor Vance's well known case-book on
insurance contains approximately one-third more material than the
first edition contained. His statement in the introduction, that he
has made a shift of emphasis from history to economics, is well sustained. The reason for this, as he says, has been the separate development of American Insurance law, which has been more varied and
functions far more for social welfare than the rules developed in England. Like the second edition of Professor Vance's treatise, the casebook lays considerable emphasis upon risk-bearing, risk-shifting and
risk-distribution which was not found in the old editions.
An excellent chapter is inserted on state control of insurance
with respect to insurance as commerce, with respect to insurance as
affecting the public interest, and with respect to the power to control
rates. A considerable working over of the material on insurable interest is also found, a distinction being drawn more closely between
property and life insurance than between the different types of property insurance on the one hand and life insurance on the other.
There are few chapters dealing with the premium as the distributive share of the risk that falis upon the insured. Concealment, representations and warranties are dealt with as methods of ascertaining
and controlling the risk. Here again Professor Vance breaks away
from the historical method of approach.
The chapter on Waiver and Estoppel wpll illustrates the thoroughgoing revision of the book. In the first edition seventeen cases were
used. In the new edition there are thirty-two cases, of which 24 are
either new cases or cases not used before, leaving eight of the old
cases republished in the new edition, and nine of the old cases discarded. 'Professor Vance inserts the definition of waiver as found
in the Restatement of Contracts Section 291, and also the explanatory
notes thereto. It is not clear however, that he adopts that definition
of waiver, and it would seem that possibly two fact situations found
in his article in 34 Yale Law Journal (834 at pages 843-4, cases 6 and
7 dealing with what he calls "waiver proper") would not be waiver,
or at any rate the same result would not be reached if the Retatement definition were followed. The topic "Rights Under Policies"
has been very greatly expanded, and especially has -there been expan-
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slon of the problems under subrogation. There has also been a very
considerable expansion of the chapter dealing with "Construction of
the Policy". In the last chapter, the law of various other types of
insurance policies not dealt with at all, or at least not largely, in the
earlier edition, is dealt with.
This reviewer believes that this is by far the best case-book published on Insurance. It perhaps more nearly illustrates the "functional
approach", than other orthodox case-books. The chief difficulty that
most instructors will find will be its size. At best not more than
three hours are usually given to the subject of Insurance. A great
amount of selection must be made. This however, is probably not
a fair criticism, since the cases selected by Professor Vance will be
suggestive for the instructor and leaves him a considerable choice.
ALviN E. EvANs.

